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THE

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY RESPONDS

To

DARFUR:

ICC PROSECUTION RENEWS HOPE FOR
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE'
John E. Tanagho and John P. Hermina

I.

Introduction

Meet Hamid Saleem. Saleem lived with his wife and four children in a small
village in northern Darfur called Boba. 2 On April 30, 2004 all that changed.
That day a Sudanese military aircraft attacked his village. He and his family fled
into the surrounding mountains. It was the last time he saw his family. The
Janjaweed militia killed his brother and fifteen other Darfuris in a raid and then
buried them in a pit. Now safe in London, Saleem said: "What is happening
'3
there is genocide. A specific race is being targeted - my Zagawa tribe."
Six years old-that is the current age of the first genocide of the twenty-first
century. 4 Over the past six years, the mostly Arab Islamic government of Sudan
has waged a violent war against the mostly Black African tribes of Darfur. 5
Through an orchestrated campaign of violence and extermination, Sudan's
Armed Forces (SAF) and its proxy Arab Militias, the Janjaweed, 6 have killed
I This article grew out of a paper submitted for the spring 2008 International Criminal Law Seminar
co-taught by Professors Jerry E. Norton and Alan Raphael at Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
John Tanagho is an associate at the law firm of Schiff Hardin LLP where he focuses in a wide range of
general litigation, with a concentration in white collar and corporate compliance matters. John thanks his
wife Wendy for all her support. John Hermina received his Juris Doctor from Loyola University Chicago
School of Law in May 2009. He is currently pursuing a career in human rights. John thanks his parents
and his fianc6 for all their support.
2 The story of Hamid Saleem is taken from Hamid's self-told story provided to BBCArabic.com.
Displaced by Darfur: Your Stories, BBC NEws, Oct. 2, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
5391656.stm.
3 Id. Mohamed Baraka Mohamed, 56, a lawyer and former minister in Sudan's Parliament from
2001-2005 "confirm[s] that what is going on is genocide." Id. Mohamed was beaten in school if he did
not speak Arabic. Id. He says the attitude of forced Arabisation "is not confined to the Sudanese government - other Arab and Muslim countries are included. Has a single Arab or Muslim country condemned
what is happening in Darfur?" Id.
4 Genocide Intervention Network Darfur Page, http://www.genocideintervention.net/educate/darfur
(last visited Feb. 14, 2008).
5 See Eric Reeves, Genocide by Attrition in Sudan, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2008, at B07, availableat
http://www.washingtonpost.conmwp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/04/AR2008040403087.html [hereinafter Reeves, Genocide by Attrition]. "Sudan's National Islamic Front regime" was in its "sixth year of
genocidal counterinsurgency warfare in the vast western region of Darfur, targeting African civilian
populations." Id. Eric Reeves, a professor at Smith College, is the author of A LONG DAY'S DYING:
CRITICAL MOMENTS IN THE DARFUR GENOCIDE. He is a consultant to several human rights and humanitarian organizations in Sudan.
6 The term "janjaweed" means "devils on horseback." Martin Fletcher, Janjaweed Defector Confesses Sudan's Atrocities in Darfur, SUDAN

TRIB.,

Oct. 19, 2006, available at http://www.sudantribune.

com/spip.php?article 18203.
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almost 400,000 people. 7 Sudan claims to be conducting a counterinsurgency
against rebel groups in Darfur; 8 however, the world, including the International
Criminal Court (ICC), 9 has documented Sudan's systematic attack against innocent and unarmed (non-combatant) Darfur civilians and their villages. io In addition to the murders, almost 2.5 million people are displaced; and the violence
continues virtually unabated to this day."'
Non-governmental organizations and advocacy groups have criticized and lamented, with good reason, the international community's failure to timely and
adequately respond to the atrocities in Darfur.12 The international community
has, however, slowly responded most recently with the ICC's historic issuance of
an arrest warrant for Sudan's President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir for five
counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes for his "essential role" in the murder, torture, rape, and displacement of millions of civilians in

7 Eric Reeves, How Many Deaths in Darfur?, THE GUARDIAN (ON-LNE), Aug. 20, 2007, http://
"We could easily
www.sudanreeves.org/index.phpname=news&file=article&sid=181&theme=Printer
be talking about 400,000 deaths." (quoting John Hagan, a sociologist at Northwestern University, in
Jeffrey Gettleman, Toll ofDarfur Underreported,Study Declares, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/l 5/world/africa/15darfur.htmlr= 1&scp=l&sq=sept.%2015,%2020
06,%2OHagan&st=cse).
8 See infra Part III.A (discussing rebel attacks on Sudanese government installations).
9 Established through the Rome Conference in July 17, 1998, and codified by the Rome Treaty, the
ICC is the world's first permanent international court. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Thus far, 105 States are Parties to the Rome
Treaty. In the words of ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the Court is "a tool to manage violent
international conflicts." ICC Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Presentation at the Midwest Regional Conference on International Justice: The International Criminal Court 10 Years after the Rome
Conference, Harold Washington Library, Chi., 11. (Apr. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Conference on International Justice].
10 Google Maps reveals the product of Sudan's scorched-earth campaign and the aftermath of burned
Darfur villages. Google Maps, http://maps.google.com (search for "Darfur;" then click on "Satellite"
hyperlink in upper right comer of map).
II See Amber Henshaw, Darfur: Little Hope Five Years On, BBC NEws, Feb. 26, 2008, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7263663.stm. Auriol Miller, head of Oxfam in Sudan, stated that "[t]he situation is
not better than it was five years ago." Id. Eighty thousand Darfur civilians had been displaced as of
April 2008. Ambassador Richard Williamson, Presidential Special Envoy to Sudan, Conference on International Justice, supra note 9.
12 Save Darfur Coalition President, Jerry Fowler, spoke with Darfur refugees in Chad in the middle
of 2005, right after the U.N. Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC. Jerry Fowler,
President of the Save Darfur Coalition, Conference on International Justice, supra note 9. At that time,
Darfur refugees asked him "when will Bashir be in the Hague?" Id. Fowler remembers that the people
genuinely expected that when the rest of the world found out what was happening in Darfur, they would
be protected and able to return home. Id. Fowler contends, however, that as of April 2008, there had
been "no effective international response to Darfur." Id. See also Amnesty International, Support the
Work of the International Criminal Court in Darfur, Sudan!, http://www.amnestyusa.org/justice/
page.php?id=101 1445 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009) ("Despite international outrage, not a single person
responsible for war crimes or crimes against humanity in Darfur has been brought to justice."); The Crisis
in Darfur, ReliefWeb, Aug. 21, 2006, http://www.reliefweb.int/rwRWB.NSF/db900SlID/AMMF-6SWE
2D?OpenDocument ("International response to this crisis has been shockingly slow and ineffective. Despite widespread awareness of the extent of the human rights violations in Darfur, the government of
Sudan and its allies on the U.N. Security Council have successfully blocked the imposition of punitive
international sanctions on officials responsible for masterminding the violent campaign in Darfur.").

368

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 6, Issue 2

The International Community Responds To Darfur

Darfur.' 3 The international community's main failure has been its apparent inability, or simply reluctance (lack of "will"), to physically intervene and protect
civilians from brutal violence, death, and displacement.14 The failure to ensure
the safe and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Darfur's 2.5 million displaced persons comes in a close second to the failure to stop the intentional physical violence.' 5 The United Nations Security Council has allowed Sudan's allies
with embedded self-interest, such as China and Russia, to veto or otherwise block
6
most, but not all, attempts at a meaningful response.'
We, however, should not overlook what the international community, through
the U.N., ICC, and other actors, has done in response to the crisis in Darfur; even
if that response is, to date, insufficient. While it is easy to belie the international
community's response, it is also beneficial to observe and analyze what the international community has done right.
This article discusses and examines the international community's response to
Darfur. The article does this by focusing on the varied responses of the African
Union (AU), the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCR), the U.N.
Security Council and Secretary-General, and the United States. The article especially focuses on the historic indictments and arrest warrants issued by the ICC
against three individuals, one of them being Sudan's sitting President Omar AlBashir.
13 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Bashir Warrant, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09].
On July 14, 2008, the ICC Chief Prosecutor requested an arrest warrant from the ICC Pre-trial Chamber
for President AI-Bashir for ten counts of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in
Darfur. Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor Presents Case Against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir, For Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes in Darfur (July 14, 2008), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id=406&l=en.html. This article does not extensively discuss
the ICC's historic issuance of a warrant for Bashir because this article was written several months prior.
14 Ambassador Richard Williamson, Presidential Special Envoy to Sudan, Conference on International Justice, supra note 9 ("We have done very little on the ground to prevent the people of Darfur from
experiencing suffering.").
15 Reeves, Genocide by Attrition, supra note 5. "The consensus among nongovernmental aid organizations is that they have access to only 40 percent of the population in need; 2.5 million of the 4.3 million
Darfuris affected by conflict-primarily women and children-can't be securely reached by those attempting to provide food, clean water, shelter and primary medical care." Id. The failed delivery of
sufficient aid is a byproduct of the failure to end the violence. Id. "Violence in Darfur also targets aid
workers and peacekeepers, limiting the ability of the international community to conduct humanitarian
operations." Genocide Intervention Network Darfur Page, supra note 4. There has also been at least one
reported attack on an international organization's vehicle. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in the Darfur Region of the Sudan, 19, delivered to the Chairperson of the
Commission of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/3 (May 7, 2004) [hereinafter Report of the High
Commissioner] (reporting an attack by Janjaweed militia on a international organization's vehicle).
16 John Prendergast & Colin Thomas-Jensen, Darfur, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PU3LIC
SHOULD KNow 2.0, 150 (Roy Gutman et al. eds., 2007). China's interest lies primarily in its economic
desire to drill and extract oil from Sudan's oil fields. Currently, "[t]hrough its state-owned companies,
China controls almost all of the known oil potential in Sudan ....
China holds the majority rights to drill
in eight" of Sudan's nine significant oil blocks. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, INVESTING IN TRAGEDY: CHINA'S
MONEY, POLrnCS, AND ARMS IN SUDAN 3 (2008), http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/08031 l-cahinvesting-in-tragedy-report.pdf. This fifty-eight page report by Human Rights First painstakingly documents China's deep economic investment in Sudan, even in the face of Sudan's genocide against the
people of Darfur.
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Three points are put forward in this article. First, the U.N. Security Counsel
and the ICC can work together to seek to end impunity by bringing international
criminals to justice through fair and independent mechanisms. Second, much can
be learned about the international community's potential to respond to ongoing
international crimes by examining what the international community has done as
we can be critiquing what the international community has failed to do. Finally,
the international community's failure to protect civilians in Darfur may, one day,
help create a new binding rule of international law, namely, the Responsibility to
Protect (R2P).
This article proposes that: (1) national and international actors utilize existing
mechanisms to execute the outstanding ICC warrants against three of the most
culpable people for the atrocities in Darfur: Ahmad Harun, Ali Kushayb, and
Omar Al-Bashir; 17 and (2) the U.N., Rome Statute' States Parties, the U.N. Sethe R2P princicurity Council, and other national and international bodies affirm
18
ple so that it may become a binding rule of international law.
In the end, this article concludes that there is hope for the ICC and the international community's ability and willingness to respond to genocide and crimes
against humanity by holding those most responsible accountable for their crimes,
and, therefore, ending the epidemic of impunity. 19 There is also hope that our
collective failure to adequately and timely respond to Darfur and the U.N.'s subhelp "crystallize" 20 a new intersequent response through varied resolutions will
21
national norm-the Responsibility to Protect.
17 See infra Part V.1 (proposing that U.N. Member States, States Parties to the Rome Statute, and
other, work to execute the outstanding arrest warrants).
18 See infra Part V.2 (proposing that all relevant international and national actors affirm the R2P
principle).
19 "[A]n international system of justice is emerging and the age of impunity is coming to an end."
Jonathan Fanton, Supporting the 'Court of Last Resort,' SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 21, 2008, availa(discussing the
ble at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20080421/news-mzle2lfanton.html
ICC's work to bring Lord's Resistance Army rebels to justice and arguing that the United States should
become a State Party to the Rome Statute). Mr. Fanton is President of the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation. Id. This emergence can be seen in the Prosecutor's indictment of Al-Bashir,
which is the first time a sitting head of state has been indicted by a permanent international criminal
court. Nicholas D. Kristof, President Bashir and Genocide, N.Y. TIMEs, July 14, 2008, available at
http:/Ikristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/president-bashir-and-genocide/?scp=4&sq=indictment%20
Bashir&st=cse. See also infra notes 220 and accompanying text (discussing the ICC Prosecutor's request
for and issuance of a warrant for Bashir).
20 "Crystallization" is the process where a non-binding legal concept becomes a binding rule of international law. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 38 (Feb.
20). For a more in-depth look at how the U.N.'s response to Darfur, including the Security Council
resolutions, might lead to R2P becoming a binding rule of international law, see Max W. Matthews,
Tracking The Emergence Of A New InternationalNorm: The Responsibility To ProtectAnd The Crisis In
Darfur, 31 B.C. Irr'L & CoMP. L. REv. 137 (2008). Matthews argues that recent Security Council
resolutions in response to the continuing international crimes in Darfur, Sudan, "explicitly invoke R2P
while calling for protective actions in accordance with the principle" [and] [i]f the Security Council
continues to implement R2P, the principle may crystallize into a binding norm of international law in the
foreseeable future."
21 See Int'l Comm'n on Intervention & State Sovereignty [ICISS], The Responsibility to Protect:
Report of the InternationalCommission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), www.iciss.ca/pdf/
Commission-Report.pdf [hereinafter ICISS Report]; see also Michael Clough, Darfur: Whose Responsibility To Protect, HuMAN RiGrs WATCH, http://hrw.org/wr2k5/darfur/l.htm (noting that a U.N. Panel
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II.

Background

This part discusses Sudan's troubled political history, its current
demographics, the North-South conflicts, and the events preceding the Darfur
conflict.

A.

22

Sudan's Troubled Political History

In order to better understand the conflict in Darfur, this article will briefly
address the relevant events preceding this crisis, beginning with a brief political
history of Sudan. The people of Sudan have experienced constant turmoil since
their independence from Egypt and Britain in 1956.23 The past governments in
Khartoum have "hoarded the country's wealth and treated its citizens with the
'24
utmost contempt.
At independence, Northern, Southern, and Western Sudan came together
under a single democratic government. 25 Democracy, however, lasted for only
two years before the first coups d'etat overthrew the government and established
a military regime. 26 Sudan attempted to restore democracy on two more occasions: the first from 1965 to 1969, and the second from 1985 to 1989.27 Each
democratic rule ended with a coups d'etat creating a military regime. 28 The current government is the result of a 1989 coup led by the current president Omar
29
Hassan Al-Bashir.
B.

Sudan's Current Demographics

Currently, ethnic Black Africans make up fifty-two percent of Sudan's population of forty million, while ethnic Arab Africans make up about thirty nine perreferred to the emerging norm of the international responsibility to protect civilians where governments
are powerless or unwilling to do so).
22 See infra Part II (discussing Sudan's troubled political history, its current demographics, the
North-South conflicts, and the events preceding the Darfur conflict).
23 See generally Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur [ICOI], Report of the International Commission
of Inquiry on Darfurto the United Nations Secretary-General,2 (Jan. 25, 2005), available at hltp://www.

un.org/news/dh/sudan/com-inq-darfur.pdf [hereinafter ICOI Report]; Prendergast & Thomas-Jensen,
supra note 16, at 147.
24 Prendergast & Thomas-Jensen, supra note 16, at 147.

25 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 18; R.S. O'Fahey, The Sudan: Past, Present, and Future: Does
DarfurHave A Future In The Sudan, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AF. 27, 27-29 (2006). Modern Sudan is

the result of Egyptian and British involvement in the region. Id. Egypt controlled Northern Sudan until
Britain controlled Egypt and also took control of Northern Sudan. Id. Worried about the French, the
British quickly captured Southern Sudan in 1898. Id. In 1916, the British also managed to gain control
over the Darfur region. Id. Prior to British control, Darfur was an independent nation. Id. At independence, all three regions became the State of Sudan. Id.
26 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 18.
27
28
29

Id.
Id.
Sudan President Marks Coup Anniversary with Promise of Peace, SUDAN

available at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article3.
Omar al-Bashir in various sources.
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cent of the population. 30 The Darfur region's six million people consist mostly
of Black African Muslims. 3 1 With a life expectancy of about fifty years, the
population is growing at a rate of two percent a year. 32 Though most of the
33
people in Sudan speak Arabic, 130 other languages are also spoken in Sudan.
Sudan's land mass is about one quarter the size of the United States, and most of
34
the population lives in rural areas.
C.

The North-South Conflicts and Other Events Leading to the Darfur

Conflict
The 1955 - 1972 Conflict Against the Anya Rebels

1.

The North and South entered into conflict starting with the rule of General
Ibrahim Abbdud in 1955. General Abbdud supported the spread of Islam and
Arabic throughout Sudan. 35 The South consisted mostly of Christians and Animist Black Africans, while the North consisted mostly of Arab-Muslim Africans.
Frustrated with the decision, the South resisted the changes even to the point of
an armed rebellion until they reached an agreement with the former leader, Colonel Gaafar Mohamed A1-Nimeiri in 1972.36 This agreement, among other things,
37
gave autonomy to the South.
After the discovery of oil in Southern Sudan, Colonel Al-Nimeiri effectively
canceled the agreement in order to capitalize on this valuable resource. 38 In addition to destroying the South's autonomy and siphoning its oil, Colonel AlNimeiri, under the influence of the National Islamic Front 39 and the Muslim
30 CIA The World Factbook, Sudan Page, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact
book/geos/su.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009) [hereinafter CIA Factbook].
31 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 20, 22. The Sudan, ENCYCLOPWDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://
www.britannica.com/eb/article-24339 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). The Distinction between Arab Africans and Black Africans are vague at best. Id. Though the distinctions were not considered to be a
source of conflict in the past, the distinction became a justification and instigator in the conflict. Id.
One's tribal affiliations and his/her perception of identity are among the many factors that comprise this
distinction. Id. While many claim to be ethnically Arab are actually racially mixed between Africans
and Arabs. Id.
32 CIA Factbook, supra note 30.
33 Ethnologue Report for Sudan, Languages of Sudan, http://www.ethnologue.com/showcountry.asp
?name=sd.
34 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 17; CIA Factbook, supra note 30.
35 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 18.
36 Id. at 18. Gaafar A-Nimeii is also spelled Jafar Numayri in other sources.
37 Id.
38 Id.

39 Who's Who: Significant People and Organisations, http://www.sudanupdate.org/WHOSWH0/
N1F.HTM (last visited Feb. 15, 2009); Profile: Sudan's Islamist Leader, BBC NEWS, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3190770.stm [hereinafter Sudan's Islamist Leader]. The National Islamic Front
(NIF) originated from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Who's Who: Significant People and Organisations, supra note 39. The NIF is a political group seeking the implementation of Sharia Law and is also

responsible for the coup removing Sadiq al-Mahdi, Turabi's brother in law. Id.
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led by Hassan Al-Turabi,4° instated Sharia Law throughout Sudan
Brotherhood
41
in 1983.
Two more coups took place after 1983, with the second one putting Al-Bashir
in power. 42 Al-Bashir, also supported and influenced by Hassan Al-Turabi, implemented changes into the judicial system to fit his views of political Islam,
further fueling the conflict.4 3 Later, A1-Bashir's party, the National Congress,
implemented a Constitution and held elections in 1998. 44 Still displeased, opposing parties boycotted the elections and Al-Bashir was elected president.45 AlBashir's party also won most of the parliamentary seats. 4 6 Following a dispute
between Al-Bashir and the National Congress, Al-Bashir dissolved the Parliament and placed Hassan Al-Turabi and several officials in alliance with AlTurabi into custody.

47

The Twenty Year North-South War

2.

Destroying a peaceful period of eleven years, Colonel Al-Nimeiri triggered a
second civil war in 1983 that lasted twenty years. 48 Like Khartoum's violent
strategy in Darfur, the Government sponsored and armed ethnically-based mili40 Dr. Usha Sanyal, POLS 304-Politics of the Middle East: Glossary, Fall 2004, http://www.queens.
edu/undergraduate/courses/POLS304glossary.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2009). The Muslim Brotherhood
is "a political group, strong in Egypt (1930-1952) and in several other Arab countries, calling for an
Islamic political and social system and opposing Western power and cultural influence." Id. Both the NIF
and the Muslim Brotherhood were lead by Hassan AI-Turabi. Sudan's Islamist Leader, supra note 39.
Hassan A1-Turabi is a Sunni Muslim born in 1932 to a Sufi Muslim sheikh. Id. Turabi led the Muslim
Brotherhood and, after the 1985 coup, he organized the NIF in prison. Id. Currently Turabi is under
house arrest after a power struggle with El-Bashir. Id.
41 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 18; Timeline: Sudan, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middleeast/country-profiles/827425.stm.
42 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 18-19.

19.
Ghazi Suleiman & Curtis Francis Doebbler, Human Rights in Sudan in the Wake of the New

43 Id. at
44

Constitution, 6 No. 1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (1998), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/

fal198/ghazi.html.
45 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 19.
46 Sudan's Islamist Leader, supra note 39; ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 19.
47

ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 19.

48

Simon Apiku, Sudan in Danger of Reverting to North-South War, REUTERS, Sept. 13, 2007, http://

www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSAPI25818020070913; ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 18.
During the North-South civil war, the North enslaved countless numbers of Southern Sudanese people.
AMBASSADOR SHIRiN TAHIR-KHELI REMARKED AT THE 57th Session of the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights:
How will history judge the 57th Commission should it fail to acknowledge the heinous practice
of slavery of people of southern Sudan? A long series of reports by U.N. special rapporteurs and
many others have it made amply clear that the Sudanese Government continues to tolerate, if not
encourage slavery. Many of the women taken north by the government-backed militias have
been raped, sexually abused, or forced into becoming sex slaves. Others are forced to work as
field hands or domestic laborers. In his interim report last fall, then-Special Rapporteur Leonardo

Franco, described the conditions these enslaved people face as 'extremely harsh: abuse, torture,
rape, and, at times, killing being the norm.'

AMBASSADOR SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI, HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS Item 9: Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World (Mar.

30, 2001) (transcript available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2001/1806.htm).
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tias to attack Southern rebel groups, "terrorize and forcibly displace civilians, and
intimidate humanitarian workers to force their withdrawal." 49 By the end of the
conflict, two million people had died and four and half million people were
50
displaced.
After North-South peace talks began in 2002, the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM) and the government of Sudan5 1 signed the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2004.52 At this time, however, it is unclear whether
the North-South peace accord will last, as reports show that Al-Bashir's National
53
Congress Party (NCP) refuses to uphold their end of the agreement.
In September 2007, Sudanese Security Forces raided a SPLM office in Khartoum. 54 The SPLM has repeatedly expressed concerns about the sincerity of the
NCP because the NCP is selectively implementing the CPA and attempted to
renegotiate several provisions. 55 The biggest disagreements revolve around the
protocol on the oil-rich Abyei region, demarcation of the North-South boundary
56
line, and the complete departure of Northern forces from Southern Sudan.
Khartoum refuses to relinquish Abyei's lucrative oil fields and recently rejected a
new boundary proposed by an international commission that would give Abyei to
57
the South.
SPLM officials report that Khartoum is mobilizing Arab tribes, the Misseriya,
to sabotage the CPA's implementation. 58 SPLM leaders further allege that the
NCP is withholding promised money for a census necessary for the 2009 elec59
tions and a referendum on the secession of the South from Sudan in 2011.
Hopefully the international community will not lose sight of the importance of
the CPA's implementation, even as it focuses on the crisis in Darfur. History
shows that the North-South conflict is never completely unrelated to the Darfur
conflict.
Throughout the North-South peace talks, the people of Darfur were left completely out of the process. 60 Britain incorporated Darfur into Sudan once British
49 Prendergast & Thomas-Jensen, supra note 16, at 147.
50 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 19.
51 The government of Sudan will also be referred to as "Sudan," "Sudanese Government," "Khar-

toum," and "Khartoum Government."
52 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 19.
53 Apiku, supra note 48.
54

Id.

55 Id.
56

Id.

57 Alfred de Montesquiou, A Sudan Town Raises North-South Tensions, Fox NEWS, Jan. 1, 2008,
http://origin.foxnews.com/wires/2008Jan0l/0,4670,SudanVolatileTown,00.html.
58 Derek Kilner, Clashes on Sudan's North-South Border Threaten Peace Deal, VOICE OF AM., Mar.
10, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-03-10-voa49.cfm.
59 Apiku, supra note 48. The Misseriya tribes were among the Arab tribes Khartoum armed to fight
against the SPLM during the twenty-year civil war, "in much the same way as the Janjaweed were armed
in Darfur." Kilner, supra note 58.
60 Lydia Polgreen, An Incomplete Peace: Sudan's Never-Ending War With Itself,N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/04/world/africa/04darfur.html.
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rule ended. And once Sudan claimed independence, it incorporated Darfur into
Sudan. 6 1 Administratively, three Governors appointed by the Sudanese government govern the North, South, and Western regions of Darfur.6 2 Under Colonel
A1-Nimeiri, the Governors were given judicial and executive powers. 63 This
move effectively eliminated the tribal systems already in place. 64 The people of
Darfur used these tribal systems to resolve problems resulting from the influx of
immigrants and inter/intra-tribal relations. 65 The people of Darfur perceived the
negatively affecting their priSudanese government as unnecessary interveners
66
vate affairs, rather than as a neutral party.
Prior to the Darfur crisis and the peace talks between North and South Sudan,
tensions were brewing in Darfur. People began to smuggle and import weapons
into Darfur, making arms much more available. 67 Darfur's tribes began to organize themselves militarily. 68 The Arab African nomadic tribes organized them' 70
69
selves into the "Arab Gathering" and the Fur started the "African Belt.
These groups clashed and the government intervened, along with several tribal
leaders, and temporarily settled the conflict between the groups. 7 1 The people of
refusal to resolve the lingering and growDarfur, however, still resented Sudan's
72
tensions.
political
and
economic
ing
III. Discussion
This Part will discuss the five-year conflict in Darfur. 73 It will also go through
findings
a timeline of important events. 74 The section on the Pretrial Chamber's
75
in Part IV discusses in more detail the specific atrocities in Darfur.
61 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 20.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 22.
64 Id.

65 Id. at 21-22.
66 Id. at 23.

67 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 22. Foreign countries worried about Libya's pursuits with Chad and
the war in Southern Sudan have all contributed to the availability of modern weapons in the Darfur

region.
68 Id.

69 Emily Wax, Sudan's Ragtag Rebels, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2004, at AO, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.conac2/wp-dyn/A 1193-2004Sep6?language=printer. In addition to seeking removal of
African tribes that were given land during British Rule, the Arab Gathering came together under the
notions of Arab supremacy.
70 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 22.
71 Id.
72 Id.

73 See infra Part III (discussing the Darfur conflict).
74 See infra Part III (discussing a timeline of the Darfur conflict). For a detailed timelines of the
Darfur conflict, see The crisis in Darfur, a timeline, CBC NEWS, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/
sudan/darfur.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).

75 See infra Part IV (discussing the findings of the ICC's pretrial chamber).
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The Conflict in Darfur. 76

A.

Sudan's government continued to neglect, marginalize, and discriminate
against the people of Darfur. In late 2002, the rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation
Movement/Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), attacked
government sites, mainly police stations. 77 The rebels voiced their concerns
about the "socio-economic and political marginalization of Darfur and its people."'78 Sudan's government believed that the people of Darfur supported these
rebel groups in their rebellion against the Sudanese government. 79 The rebels
wanted everyone in Sudan to have fairer representation even though the majority
of the rebel groups were made up of the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa tribes. 80
The Sudanese government ignored the rebel groups because it wanted to resolve
the situation with the South and did not regard the rebels as a serious military
issue. 8 1
On April 25, 2003, the rebels attacked the unsuspecting Sudanese government
at military installations in El Fashir, the state capital of North Darfur.82 Because
Sudan's military was preoccupied in the South, Sudan lacked the immediate capability to deal with the rebel attack. 83 Sudan also had another complicated problem preventing its military from responding to the attacks: its military consisted
84
mainly of people from Darfur who were reluctant to attack their own people.
The Government responded to this challenge by calling upon local Darfur tribes
to assist in the fighting against the rebels. 85 Sudan recruited Arab nomadic tribes
to join the force, but people from neighboring countries, including Chad and the
76 Countless articles, government and NGO reports and whole books have been written about the
conflict in Darfur. This article, therefore, does not presume or attempt to fully report on the conflict. For
more in depth information and analysis see, e.g., Report of the High Commissioner, supra note 15; JEN
MARLOW WITH AISHA BAIN & ADAM SHAPIRO, DARFUR DIARIES: STORIES OF SURVIVAL (Nation Books
2006); ERIC REEVES, A LONG DAYS DYING: CRITICAL MoMENrs IN THE DARFUR GENOCIDE (Michael
Brassard ed., Key Publishing House, Inc., 2007); and DON CHEADLE & JOHN PRENDERGAST, NOT ON
OUR WATCH: THE MISSION To END GENOCIDE IN DARFUR AND BEYOND (Hyperion 2007).
77 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 22. The SLA and the JEM were formed by different armed village
groups around 2001 and 2002 GlobalSecurity.org, Darfur Liberation Front, Sudan Liberation Movement
(SLM) Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) Justice and Equality Movement, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/para/darfur.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2009) [hereinafter GlobalSecurity.org]. "Broadly
speaking the SLA and JEM share an ethnic background, coming primarily from the Zaghawa, Fur and
Masaalit tribes." Report of the High Commissioner, supra note 15,
5, at 6. These two main rebel
groups have since "fractured into over a dozen groups." Save Darfur Emergency Briefing (Save Darfur
Coalition, D.C.) July 2007, at 1, available at http://darfur.3cdn.net/ddc3ff59297f0024eb-ium6i624f.pdf.
78 GlobalSecurity.org, supra note 77; ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 23. Report of the High Commissioner, supra note 15, 5, at 4.
79 Prendergast & Thomas-Jensen, supra note 16, at 146.
80 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 23.
81

Id.

82 Prendergast & Thomas-Jensen, supra note 16, at 148 ("The rebels bombarded and temporarily
captured the airport and the local military headquarters .. destroyed government aircrafts, killed scores
of government soldiers, [and] captured the local military commander .
.
ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 23.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 23-24; ICISS, supra note 21, at 23-24.
85
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Central African Republic, also joined in the fighting. 86 By doing this, Sudan
intentionally exploited the existing tensions between the different African and
Arab tribes. 87 The Arab militia members were dually motivated by ethnic and
racial hatred and the Sudanese government's promise of "state-sanctioned robbery of land and booty."'88 In exchange for fighting with the government, Sudan
89
also gave the Janjaweed Arab militias monetary gifts and grants.
Fighting between the rebels and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and
Janjaweed forced hundreds of thousands of refugees into Chad and the Central
African Republic. 90 By September 2003, the SLA and the Sudanese government
had agreed to a ceasefire while they discussed the underdevelopment of Darfur.9 '
Soon after, however, both parties claimed that the other had violated the agreement. 92 In December 2003, the Janjaweed renewed their attacks by burning vil93 These new Janjaweed attacks forced
lages, and murdering and raping civilians.
94
Chad.
into
flee
to
refugees
100,000
In early 2004, the media began focusing on Darfur 95 and the U.N. called the
crisis "one of the worst [humanitarian situations] in the world. '9 6 The Sudanese
government and Janjaweed continued their joint assault on the people of Darfur,
causing more refugees to escape into Chad. 97 In April, the rebels and Sudan's
government entered into another ceasefire; however, the agreement lasted only
one month as a village was attacked in May and both sides quickly blamed each
other. 98 In the spring of 2004, the United Nations High Commission for Human
Rights (UNHCHR) conducted an investigation into the conflict and issued a report in May 2004. 99 In July and September 2004, two more rounds of peace talks
failed as Sudan refused to remove its SAF from Darfur or disarm the
Janjaweed. 1°°
86 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 24.
87 ICISS, supra note 21, at 23-24. Darfur refugees interviewed by staff from the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights "described the Janjaweed as being exclusively 'Arab', as opposed to the victims
who were described as 'black' or 'African."' Report of the High Commissioner, supra note 15, 33, at
11.
88 Prendergast & Thomas-Jensen, supra note 16, at 148.
89 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 24.
90 The crisis in Darfur, a timeline, supra note 74.
91 Id.
92

Id.

93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Prendergast & Thomas-Jensen, supra note 16, at 146 ("Reports of war crimes and crimes against
humanity in Darfur, western Sudan, began appearing in the western news media in early 2004.").
96 The crisis in Darfur, a timeline, supra note 74; World's worst humanitariancrisis unfolding in
Darfur, Sudan, UN NEWS CENTRE, Mar. 19, 2004, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=
10142&Cr=sudan&Crl=.
97 The crisis in Darfur, a timeline, supra note 74.
98 Id.;
Report of the High Commissioner, supra note 15, 7, at 6-7.

99 See infra note 133 (discussing some of the report's findings).
100 The crisisin Darfur, a timeline, supra note 74; New Sudan Resolution 'Unbalanced', BBC NEWS,

Sept. 15, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3659204.stm.
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Through the end of 2004 and most of 2005, the U.N. and the United States
released statements concerning the atrocities in Darfur, Sudan's involvement, and
the worsening situation.10 Sudan, with the support of China, sluggishly and passively responded to the international community.10 2 The Sudanese government
stated that they were not intimidated by sanctions or by the U.N. 0 3 While the
United States accused Sudan of genocide, the U.N. imposed travel bans and froze
assets of several individuals accused of committing crimes in Darfur. 1°4 In
March 2005, the U.N. Security Council referred the situation to the ICC, hoping
to bring the criminals to justice. 105
In March 2005, Chad began accusing Sudan of supporting Chadian rebels set
on overthrowing Chad's government. 10 6 In September 2005, Sudan and the
10 7
rebels attempted to achieve peace by engaging in talks in Abuja, Nigeria.
Though both the JEM and the SLA joined the talks, a faction from the SLA
disagreed to join and boycotted the talks. 10 8 These talks and a second round of
talks in November of 2005 failed to bring about peace.' 0 9 Former U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan reported to the U.N. that Sudan continually blocked aid
from getting to civilians in Darfur. 1 0 The U.N. tried to rally the international
community, specifically the United States, China, and Russia, to take action as
the situation deteriorated."' The U.N. also called upon Sudan to deliver on its
promises to cease attacks on civilians.' 12 While the U.N. tried to take action and
supply resources and peace-keeping troops, Sudan refused to allow the U.N. to
1 3
enter claiming that the U.N. had an alternative agenda.

101 The crisis in Darfur, a timeline, supra note 74.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.

105 Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Welcomes Adoption of Security Council Resolution Referring Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to International Criminal Court Prosecutor, U.N. Doc. SG/
SM/9797 (Mar. 31, 2005).
106 SUDAN-CHAD: Deby accuses Janjawid of killing his civilians, vows punishment, IRIN NEWS,

Sept. 29, 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/miilitary/ibrary/news/2005/09/mii-050929-irinO4.htm; The
crisis in Darfur, a timeline, supra note 74.
107 The crisis in Darfur, a timeline, supra note 74.
108 Id.As of early 2008, there are an estimated twenty-seven rebel factions that are roaming around
the Darfur region. Zachary Ochieng, Rebel Factions Thick On the Ground As Hybrid Force Deploys, E.
AFR., Jan. 28, 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200801281522.htm. These factions complicate matters
as it becomes more difficult to engage in peace talks and to have all groups approve of the deal. Id. The
SLA and the JEM both want the groups to reunite before reengaging in peace talks. Id.
109 The crisis in Darfur, a timeline, supra note 74.
110 Id.
Ml1Id.
112 Id.
113 Sudan Rejects 'Colonial' Troops, BBC NEWS, June 20, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilafrica/
5097868.stm.
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On May 8, 2006, an SLA faction and Sudan's government signed the Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA) under strong international pressure.' 14 The DPA, however, was flawed and incomplete because it "lacked implementation guarantees"
for disarming the Janjaweed; compensating Darfur's victims; facilitating the return of displaced people to their homes; and the peacekeeping handover from the
1 15
AU to U.N.
Through November 2006, the U.N. continued to call on the international com16
munity to take action and for Sudan to cooperate and allow the U.N. to enter."
The U.N.'s requests fell on deaf ears and Sudan continued to support the
Janjaweed militias and blocked aid from reaching civilians. Not much improved
on the ground during 2007 or thus far in 2008.117 Sudan continued to refuse the
U.N. access into Sudan even when it was under agreement with China to do
1 18

SO.

China continued its steadfast support of Sudan with millions of dollars in
grants, as well as filling the role of being Sudan's largest trade partner.' 19 Beijing also continued to supply weapons to Sudan in blatant violation of the international arms embargo on Sudan. 120 Chinese made and imported weapons were
being used by the Janjaweed militias to murder Darfur civilians.1 2 1 These illeweapons, but also
gally imported weapons included not only small arms and light
1 22
major weapons systems such as tanks and fighter planes.

114 Darfur Peace Agreement, May 5, 2006, available at http://www.africa.berkely.edu/Sudan/Darfur/
DPAABUJA-5-05-06-withsignatures.pdf [hereinafter Darfur Peace Agreement].
115 Prendergast & Thomas-Jensen, supra note 16, at 151. But see Darfur Peace Agreement, supra note
114 ("[The DPA is] a fair agreement that addresses the long-standing marginalization of Darfur, and
charts a path for lasting peace for the innocent victims of the crisis.").
116 The crisis in Darfur, a timeline, supra note 74.
117 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum-Committee on Conscience, http://www.ushmm.org/
conscience/alert/darfur/contents/02-current/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2008) [hereinafter USHMM].
118

Id.

119 Id.; CIA Factbook, supra note 30.
120 William D. Hartung, Deadly Traffic: China's Arms Trade With The Sudan, ARMS AND SECURITY
INITATIVE POLicY BRIEF (New Am. Found., D.C.) Aug. 2008, at 2, availableat http://www.newamerica.
net/files/080606PBChinaArmsTrade.pdf. "Beijing has been by far the most egregious violator of international sanctions on Sudan, providing up to 90 percent of the country's small arms and light weapons
between 2004 and 2006 .... " Id. (citing Investing In Tragedy: China's Money, Politics, and Arms in
Sudan (Human Rights First, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2008, at 11-12, availableat http://www.humanrights
first.info/pdf/0803 11-cah-investing-in-tragedy-report.pdf.).
121 Id.at 1-2.
122 Id.at 2-3. In June 2008, BBC News documented how China was "training [Sudanese] fighter
pilots who fly Chinese A5 Fantan fighter jest in Darfur." Hilary Anderson, China 'IsFuelling War In
Darfur,' BBC NEWS, June 13, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7503428.stm. The BBC has
proven that "Chinese Fanton fighter jets were flying on missions out of Nyala airport in south Darfur in
February [2008]," the very same month when "Kaltam Abakar Mohammed, a mother of seven, watched
three of her children blown to pieces as they were attacked by a fighter jet on" February 19. Id.According to Clare da Silva, an international lawyer, the BBC's evidence means China is violating the arms
embargo on multiple levels. Id.
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In 2008, Sudan returned to using scorched-earth tactics, thus worsening the
humanitarian situation and increasing the violence. 123 In April 2008, Human
Rights Watch (HRW) confirmed a U.N. report that claimed soldiers along with
the Janjaweed are still raping girls and looting villages. 24 In addition, HRW
claims that the risk of rape 25 or assault towards women and girls during periods
of calm match the same risk during an attack by the Janjaweed. 26 As recently as
early August 2008, reports indicated that Sudan once again was launching attacks
on rebels and civilians in northern Darfur, killing an estimated sixteen civilians
according to Ibrahim al-Hillo, a commander of the Sudan Liberation Movement. 127 Author and activist Eric Reeves goes as far as to say that the level of
ethnically motivated violence in Darfur is back up to the tragic year of 2004.128
IV.

Analysis

This Part examines and analyzes the international community's response to the
Darfur conflict. 129 First, it looks at the multi-layered U.N. response.130 Then it
discusses the ICC's response, including that of the Chief Prosecutor and Pretrial
Chamber.' 3 ' Finally, this Part examines the United States' response to Darfur. 132
A.

The United Nation's Response

The U.N. has responded to the genocide in Darfur, albeit slowly, in several
different ways. First, the UNHCHR conducted an investigation into the conflict
in the spring of 2004 and issued a report in May 2004 documenting the ongoing
123 USHMM, supra note 117. "Recently, in a campaign reminiscent of the worst military violence of
the genocide's early years, Khartoum's regular ground and air forces coordinated with the Janjaweed in
massive scorched-earth assaults against civilian villages in West Darfur." Genocide by Attrition, supra
note 5.
124 James Read, Darfur Women Still Face Rape Risk, BBC NEWS, Apr. 7, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7333844.stm.
125 For more about the use of rape as weapon of war and shame in Darfur see Fidele Lumeya, Rape,
Islam, and Darfur's Women Refugees and War-Displaced,REFUGEES INT'L, Aug. 24. 2004, http://www.
reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AliDocsByUNID/e65c85d5O58bfdO549256efbOO02d443.
126 Read, supra note 124.
127 Sarah El Deeb, Rebels Say Sudanese Government Has Launched New Offensive In Northern Darfur, YAHOO CANADA NEWS, Aug. 13, 2008, http://www.paherald.sk.ca/index.cfm?pid=13&cpcat=world
&stry=69050035. Sudan's motivation to clear out the area of its current occupants and "eliminate" any
potential obstacles to control of the area seems to lie in a desire for oil. Apparently Sudan's "government
has designated the area [of northern Darfur] for future oil exploration." Id.
128 Eric Reeves, DarfurBoiling Over, SUDAN TRIB, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.
php?page=imprimable&idarticle=26172.
129 See infra Part IV (discussing the response of several key members of the international
community).
130 See infra Part IV.A (examining the response of the UNHCR, U.N. Security Council, SecretaryGeneral, and Commission of Inquiry).
131 See infra Part IV.B (analyzing the response of the ICC, its Chief Prosecutor and the Pretrial
Chamber).
132 See infra Part IV.C (looking at the United States' response through the State Department, Congress, the White House Administration, and U.S. states).
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atrocities. 133 Second, the U.N. encouraged the Sudanese Government and the
two main rebel groups to cooperate in peace talks that the AU mediated between
134
Sudan's government and the two main rebel groups for nearly three years.
Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan has emphasized that real peace in Darfur can only come from a negotiated settlement between all the parties to the
conflict. 135 When he was Secretary-General, Annan called on the parties to return to the negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria to bring an end to the violence. 136 By
emphasizing the indispensability of peace talks, Secretary General Annan worked
towards the critical goals of ending the conflict through diplomatic means and
creating a solution to the underlying power and wealth inequities that led to the
conflict erupting in 2003.
The U.N. has also responded by passing several resolutions authorizing U.N.
and U.N./AU peacekeepers to go into Darfur to stem the violence. 137 U.N. Resolution 1556, passed on July 30, 2004, also imposed an international arms em13 8
bargo on all non-government individuals and bodies, including the Janjaweed.
The U.N. strengthened these sanctions by adopting resolution 1591 in 2005.139
This resolution broadened the scope of the arms embargo and imposed a travel
ban and froze the assets of targeted individuals. 140 Additionally, the U.N. requested and created an International Commission of Inquiry ("ICOI" or the
"Commission") to investigate the violence in Darfur. l4 After the Commission
documented the ongoing violence in a report on the conflict, the U.N. Security
Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.
1.

The Security Council Authorized Peacekeepers

In 2004, the AU established the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). 142
143
AMIS' principal mission was to perform peacekeeping operations in Darfur.
133 The UHCHR reported that the Janjaweed were engaging in a "reign of terror; that the children are
suffering and are dying from starvation and exhaustion; that there is a high prevalence of dysentery,
measles and high fever; that Arab African militias with ties to Sudan are destroying food and water

supplies; that Sudan is not allowing aid organizations to enter; and that Sudan is complicit in the murder
of civilians in the region." See generally Report of the High Commissioner, supra note 15.
134 CHAD-SUDAN: President Demands More InternationalAttention On Darfur, IRIN NEWS, Apr.

18, 2006, htpp://www.globalsecurity.org/militarylibrary/news/2006/04/mil-060418-irin04.htm.
135 Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Welcomes Adoption Of Security Council
Resolution Referring Situation In Darfur, Sudan To International Criminal Court Prosecutor, U.N. Doc.
SG/SM9797 (Mar. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Secretary-General Welcomes Referral To ICC].
136

Id.

See infra A.1 (discussing U.N. resolutions authorizing peacekeepers in Darfur).
S.C. Res 1556, 1 7-8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004).
139 S.C. Res 1591,
7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005).
140 Id.I 3(c). Unfortunately, not all countries have abided by the international arms embargo. See
notes 120-122 and accompanying text (describing China's continued economic and military support of
Sudan and its importation of weapons to Sudan during 2004 - 2006).
141 ICOI Report, supra note 23.
142 See African Union Mission in Sudan, Mandate, www.amis-sudan.org/amismandate.htl (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
137
138

143

Id.
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However, due to inadequate human and financial resources, AMIS was unable to
effectively implement any of the peace agreements or lessen any of the violence
in or surrounding Darfur. t44 As a response, U.N. Security Council resolutions in
145
2004 and 2005 established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).
In August 2006, the Security Council voted in Resolution 1706 to send U.N.
peacekeepers to Darfur to supplement the small AU force. 146 But, because deployment of the force was made contingent on Sudan's consent, this new and
47
much larger peacekeeping mission was blocked by Sudan and never deployed.1
This should have come as no surprise to the U.N. and the international community since Khartoum, just two years prior, stalled and delayed the deployment of
AU peacekeepers in 2004.148 After a tenuous year-long confrontation, however,
Sudan reluctantly agreed to allow an "AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur"
149
(UNAMID) only if it consisted mainly of African troops.
In January 2007, the U.N. Security Council approved a plan to send to Darfur
about 20,000 peacekeeping troops authorized to use force in the troubled region. 150 The force, currently numbering only 9,000 and far from fully
deployed,' 51 will, in theory, be a hybrid of U.N. soldiers
and AU troops and will
152
be under the command of both the U.N. and the AU.
144 Irene Khan, et al., InternationalNGOs Call For Strong Force In Darfur: Joint Letter to the U.N.
Security Council, May 25, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/O5/25/sudan13462.htm.
145 For background on the Mission, see U.N. Mission in Sudan, Mission Background, www.unmis.
org/english/background.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). Specifically, U.N. Security Council Resolution
1590 of March 24, 2005 established the U.N. Mission in Sudan. S.C. Res 1590, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590
(Mar. 24, 2005).
146 S.C. Res. 1679, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1679 (May 16, 2006).
147 Sudan: Hybrid Peacekeeping Forcefor Darfur Must Comply With U.N. Requirements, REFUGEES
INT'L, Nov. 22, 2006, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/9673 (last visited Feb.
17, 2009) ("Khartoum is forcing the U.N. to water down its Darfur effort to a level acceptable to Sudan."); Efforts To Help DarfurAgain Reach Dead End, SUDAN TRIB., Dec. 5, 2006, available at www.
sudantribune.com/spip.php?articlel9080. Naming any excuse he could, Sudanese President Omar alBashir later told reporters that "[i]nternational troops are a colonization of Sudan." Id. Colin ThomasJensen of the International Crisis Group, a U.S. think tank said that Al-Bashir's excuses and arrogance
are "entirely coherent with (Sudan's) pattern of behavior over the last 17 years," since al-Bashir came to
power in a 1989 Islamist and military coup. Id.
148 Colum Lynch, U.N. Envoy Urges Sudan To Let Peacekeepers In, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2004,
available at www.washingtonpost.comac2/wp-dyn/A52261-2004Sepl?language=printer.
The U.N. report calls on Sudan to accept a U.N. proposal to allow about 4,000 African Union
peacekeepers and police officers to help monitor a cease-fire between the government and the
rebels. Sudan has allowed a contingent of about 300 Rwanda and Nigerian peacekeepers and
observers in Darfur, but it refused requests from the African Union to expand the mission and
provide them with the authority to protect civilians in Darfur. Id.
149 S.C. Res. 1769, pmbl., [ 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007); S.C. Res. 1706, 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006); Simon Apiku, Sudan Bowed to Pressure on DarfurForce-Opposition, REUTERS, June 19, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL1973884020070619
[hereinafter Apiku 2].
150 Security Council Approves PeacekeepingForce In Darfur, CBC NEWS, July 31, 2007, http://www.
cbc.calworldlstory2007/0713 I/darfur-force.html.
151 Apiku 2, supra note 149.
152 Id.
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2.

The International Commission of Inquiry

On September 18, 2004, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 1564
requesting that the Secretary-General "rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of inter1 53
national humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties."'
Resolution 1564 required the Commission to determine whether acts of genocide
were committed and also to identify the perpetrators "with a view to ensuring
that those responsible are held accountable."1 54 The U.N. adopted this resolution
just nine days after then-U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell reported that the
U.S. State Department had concluded that Sudan was committing genocide in
55
Darfur. 1
In October 2004, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan created the International
Commission of Inquiry ("ICOI" or "Commission") on violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur and ordered a full report in
156
three months.
a. The Commission's Findings.
On January 25, 2005, the Commission issued a 176-page report. 157 The Commission investigated the crisis in Darfur and conducted a thorough analysis of the
information gathered from its investigations.1 58 The Commission found that Sudan's government and the Janjaweed Arab militias were responsible for "serious
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to
crimes under international law."' 59 The Commission found that Sudanese government armed forces and the Janjaweed militias indiscriminately attacked civil160
ians throughout Darfur.
During these jointly planned and implemented attacks, Sudanese government
forces and militia raped, tortured, and killed civilians.16' The armed forces and
militias pillaged and destroyed villages, and forcefully displaced and caused the
disappearance of Darfur civilians. 16 2 The Commission further found that the
ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 2.
154 Id. By seeking the ultimate goal of holding "those responsible accountable," the Security Council
apparently showed where it lies in the debate between criminal prosecution and the argument of "amnesty for the sake of peace." The authors agree with the Security Council. Amnesty fosters impunity
more than peace. In the words of Pope Paul VI, "if you want peace, work for justice."
155 Ted Dagne, Cong. Research Serv., CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis,
Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy, at 4 (Nov. 29, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
row/IB98043.pdf.
156 ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 2.
153

Id.
158Id.at 3.
159 Id.
157

Id.
Id. In addition to rape, the forces and militia committed "other forms of sexual violence" against
African women and girls. Id.
162 Id.
160
161
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Government forces and Janjaweed militias deliberately directed most of their attacks against innocent civilians (non-combatants). 163 Supporting the appearance
of genocidal intent, the Commission found that the vast majority of the victims
belonged to specific African tribes: the Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit, Jebel, and
Aranga.'64
b.

The Commission's Conclusions

The Commission concluded that the Government forces and Janjaweed militias' actions could be considered crimes against humanity because they were
committed on a widespread and systematic basis.165 The Commission, however,
concluded that they did not have enough evidence to show that the Sudanese
government "pursued a policy of genocide," even though "in some instances individuals, including Government officials, may commit acts with genocidal intent."' 166 The Commission seemed eager to emphasize that this conclusion
perpetrated" in Darfur, includshould not detract "from the gravity of the crimes
1 67
ing crimes against humanity and war crimes.
3.

The Security Council Referred Darfur to the ICC

Two months after the Commission of Inquiry sent its report to the Security
Council, the Council adopted Resolution 1593 referring the situation in Darfur to
68
the ICC Prosecutor in accordance with article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.'
Then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan praised the Council for using its power
pursuant to the Rome Statute to create a suitable way to "lift the veil of impunity
' 69
that has allowed human rights crimes in Darfur to continue unchecked."'
On March 31, 2005, Secretary-General Annan called on the Sudanese Government, all parties to the Darfur conflict, and all other States and regional and
163 Id.

at 3-4.

164 Id. at 3. Neither Arab tribes nor non-African tribes were attacked. Id.
165

Id. at 3.

The Commission concluded that "the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at
least as far as the central Government authorities are concerned." Id. at 4. But see Human Rights Watch,
Presentation of The Smallest Witnesses: The Crisis in Darfur Through Children's Eyes (Human Rights
Watch, 2005) (traveling museum presentation of victimized children's drawings in which one 13-year old
child described the scene of his drawing, "I am looking at the sheep in the wadi [dry riverbed]. I see
Janjaweed coming-quickly, on horses and camels, with Kalashnikovs-shooting and yelling, 'kill the
slaves ....
' (emphasis added)).
167 These crimes are "no less serious and heinous than genocide." ICOI Report, supra note 23, at 4.
166

168 S.C. Res. 1593, $ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); see also Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, To Prosecutor of International Criminal
Court., U.N. Doc. SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005). The vote was eleven in favor, none against, and four
abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States). Id. While this action was certainly significant, some
argue that the Security Council actually did "the minimum necessary" in response to mounting pressure
after the Commission's report. See Jerry Fowler, Conference on International Justice, supra note 9 (arguing that the Security Council's resolution was its way of "kicking the can down the road").
169 Secretary-General Welcomes Referral To ICC, supra note 135.
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international bodies to fully cooperate with, and provide assistance to, the ICC
170
and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).
B.

The ICC Response

The ICC's response includes the Prosecutor's investigation, the Pretrial Chamber's findings of "reasonable grounds," and the Chamber's issuance of arrest
warrants for Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman
("Ali Kushayb").1 7 1 And most recently, the ICC continued its courageous response to the genocide in Darfur by indicting the sitting head of state of Sudan,
2
Omar Al-Bashir.17
1.

The ICC Investigation

On April 5, 2005, the ICOI sent its conclusions to the ICC Chief Prosecutor,
Luis Moreno-Ocampo.1 73 The Prosecutor acknowledged that the Commission
reported "mass killings of innocent civilians, systematic rape of girls and women,
and the burning of family homes." 174 Upon receiving the IOCI documents, Prosecutor Ocampo stated that "[w]e all have a common task: to protect life in Darfur, ending the culture of impunity."1 75 On June 1, 2005, Prosecutor Ocampo
decided to open an independent and impartial investigation' 76 into the situation in
177
Darfur.

Prosecutor Ocampo conducted a twenty month investigation into the crimes
allegedly committed in Darfur. 178 The investigation included interviews of vicId.
See infra Part B.1-3 (discussing the ICC's response to Darfur). The ICC issued its first warrants in
2005 against Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, as well as four of his
subordinates. The ICC has also issued warrants against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo of the Union of Congolese Patriots, Germain Katanga of the Forces of Patriotic Resistance, and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui of
the National Integrationist Front in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
172 See generally, Arrest of Sudanese President Could Have World-Wide Effects, AusTL. BROAD.
CORP., Feb. 13, 2009, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/02/13/2491424.htm.
173 Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor Receives List Prepared by Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (Apr.
5, 2005), available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/3EAOOFC5-8337-485B-BB19-54D3CDCDA
8D8.htm [hereinafter ICOI To Prosecutor].
174 Id.
175 Id. The Prosecutor's comments are encouraging in an age where good people suffer from compassion fatigue and donor fatigue. "The people of Africa and the people of the world [however] have
impunity fatigue." Gayle Smith, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and Co-Chair of the
ENOUGH Project, Conference on International Justice, supra note 9.
176 Press Release, ICC, The Prosecutor of the ICC Opens Investigation in Darfur (June 6, 2005),
available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/6840C44E-153F-43F2-9B21-B60F4C756907.htm [hereinafter Prosecutor Opens Investigation] ("The investigation will be impartial and independent, focusing
on the individuals who bear the greatest criminal responsibility for crimes committed in Darfur.").
177 See Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-Al-Rahman (Prosecutor
v. Harun), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Pretrial Chamber I, 3 (Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.
icc-cpi.intliccdocs/doc/doc279809.PDF.
178 ICC, Fact Sheet: The Situation In Darfur, the Sudan, 1, available at http://www.adh-geneva.ch/
RULAC/news/ICC-OTP-Fact-Sheet-Darfur-20070227-en.pdf [hereinafter Darfur Fact Sheet].
170

171
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tims and witnesses from Darfur 179 and a total of five missions by the OTP to
Sudan from November 2005 to January/February 2007.180 During the missions
to Sudan, the OTP interviewed and gathered information directly from Sudanese
Government officials. 181
In addition to the five missions to Sudan, the OTP also collected evidence and
statements during a total of seventy missions in seventeen countries. 182 The
Prosecutor also delivered four reports to the Security Council as required by Resolution 1593.183 On February 27, 2007, the Prosecution filed an application
under article 58(7) requesting that summonses to appear or arrest warrants be
issued by the Chamber for Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali
Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb). 184
2.

The Pretrial Chamber Findings.

a. ICC Jurisdiction
The Chamber began its discussion by noting how it had jurisdiction over the
Sudanese nationals. Although Sudan is not a State Party to the Rome Statute,
Article 12(2) does not apply where the Security Council refers a situation to the
Court pursuant to the U.N. Charter Chapter VII and Article 13(b) of the Rome
Statute. 185 The Court could, therefore, exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed in the territory of, or by nationals of, a State that is not Party to the Rome
86
Statute.1
The Prosecution informed the Court that according to the Judicial Investigations Committee (JIC), Ali Kushayb was arrested on November 28, 2006 by Sudan authorities due to an arrest warrant issued against him by Sudan in April
2005.187 The JIC indicated that Ali Kushayb was under investigation in relation
to five separate incidents from South and West Darfur. 188 The Prosecution argued that the Sudanese authorities' investigation did not encompass the conduct
that was the subject of the application before the ICC. 189 In the end, the Pretrial
Chamber easily agreed with Prosecutor Ocampo. 190
179 Id. at 2. The OTP took over 100 formal witness statements, many from victims. Id.
Darfur victims
"were interviewed in other countries because of the ongoing insecurity in Darfur." Id.at 4.

180

Id.at 6.

181

Id. at 2.

182

Id.
Id.at 6.

183

184 Prosecutor's Application Under Art. 58(7), ICC-02/05-55-US-Exp (Feb. 27, 2007); Prosecutor's
Application Under Art. 58(7), ICC-02/05-56.
185 Prosecutor v. Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07,
16.
186

Id.

187

Id. T 20.

188

Id.

189

Id. $ 21.

190Id.

386

24-25.

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 6, Issue 2

The International Community Responds To Darfur

The Court then discussed whether it had jurisdiction over the alleged crimes.
Article 8(2)(c) & (e) of the Rome Statute deals with acts committed in the course
of a conflict not of an international character. 19 1 The Chamber discussed the
92
various actors in the conflict and several of their specific attacks on each other. 1
The Chamber then easily found reasonable grounds to believe that the conflict in
Darfur was not of an international character. 193
b.

Reasonable Grounds

The ICC Pretrial Chamber found reasonable grounds 194 to believe that Ali
Kushayb was one of the most senior tribal leaders in the Wadi Salih Locality
(WSL). 19 5 Kushayb was the "Aqid al Oqada," or "colonel of colonels" in the
WSL. 196 In August 2003, Ali Kushayb was officially "appointed to a position"
in the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and was part of the Sudanese Popular Defense Forces' (SPD) structure within the SAF. t97 In his positions, Ali Kushayb
personally led and commanded thousands of the Janjaweed militia in their internationally criminal attacks against Darfur civilians and villages from August
2003 until March 2004.198 Kushayb also mobilized, recruited, armed, and fully
equipped the Janjaweed militias he commanded. 199
The Chamber further found reasonable grounds to believe that Ali Kushayb
fully implemented the counter-insurgency strategy that was fundamentally
grounded on the commission of crimes against humanity and war crimes in the
forms of rape, torture, persecution, killing of civilians, and hundreds of attacks on
Darfur villages and towns. 20 0 Darfur witnesses reported that they saw Ali
Kushayb and Ahmad Harun physically together in Darfur during the attacks and
191 Id. 1 3. The Court quotes Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute: "Paragraph 2(e) applies to armed
conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It
applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is a protracted armed
conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups."
192 Id.
35-42.
193 Id. IT 17, 35-42. The Chamber found that the conflict was between the Janjaweed and the Sudanese Government, specifically the Sudan People's Armed Forces and the Popular Defence Forces, on one
side, and the two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM), on the other side. Id. 1 36.
194 Based on Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, in interpreting and applying the standard of "reasonable grounds to believe," the Chamber followed the "reasonable suspicion" standard of the European
Convention on Human Rights Article 5(l)(c) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence on the fundamental right to personal liberty of the American Convention on Human Rights Article
7. Id. 28.
195 Id. 95.
196 Darfur Fact Sheet, supra note 178, at 4.
197 Prosecutor v. Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07,

95.

198 Id. 1 96.
199 Id. 1 105.
200 Id. 11 97-102. "This strategy became the justification for the mass murder, summary execution,
mass rape, and other grave crimes against civilians who were known not to be participants in any armed
conflict." Darfur Fact Sheet, supra note 178, at 3.
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violence. 201 And the Chamber certainly found that Harun, as well as Kushayb,
were intimately involved in the organized and systematic destruction of Darfur
villages and the killing, raping, and persecuting of Darfur civilians.20 2
As to Ahmad Harun, the Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe that
from April 2003 until September 2005, Harun served as Minister of State for the
Interior of the Sudanese Government. 20 3 He was in charge of the management of
the "Darfur Security desk" and coordinated the Government bodies involved in
the counter-insurgency in Darfur, including the SAF, the Police, the National
Security and Intelligence Service and the Janjaweed militias. 2 °4
The Chamber also found reasonable grounds to believe that Ahmed Harun
coordinated and personally participated in essential functions of the Security
Committees, including recruiting, arming, and funding the Janjaweed militias in
Darfur. 20 5 Ahmad Harun, therefore, intentionally contributed to the commission
of crimes against humanity and war crimes against Darfur civilians.2 0 6 Harun
knew that his actions would further the shared plan of the SAF and the Janjaweed
militias, which consisted of attacking the civilian populations in Darfur.2 0 7
Harun, by virtue of his position, knew all about the international crimes committed against the Darfur civilian population. 20 8 And Harun specifically knew
about the Janjaweed's methods. 20 9 Specifically, Harun's public speeches proved
that he had personal knowledge that the Janjaweed were attacking civilians and
pillaging towns and villages. 2 10 In his public speeches, Harun actually personally
encouraged the commission of these internationally criminal acts against civilians; apparently his status as a senior Sudanese Government official did not in
any way prevent him from overtly and publicly encouraging these vicious
211
crimes.
In a move that singularly exemplifies Sudan's arrogant and indignant stance
towards the international community's response to the genocide in Darfur, in
2006, the Sudanese Government actually promoted Ahmad Harun to Minister of
State of Humanitarian Affairs. 21 2 Shockingly, Harun also sits on the committee
201 Darfur Fact Sheet, supra note 178, at 4.
202 Prosecutor v. Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07,

94-99.

203 Id.$ 80.
204 Id. T$ 81-82.
205 Id.
82-83.
206 Id. 88.
207 Id. "When describing Harun, witnesses immediately identified him as the official from Khartoum
responsible for mobilising, funding, and/or arming the 'Janjaweed' or 'Fursan.' Witnesses also often
stated that they saw Ahmad Harun meeting with or addressing leaders of the Militia/Janjaweed, including
Ali Kushayb." Darfur Fact Sheet, supra note 178, at 4.
208 Prosecutor v. Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, $ 92-93.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. $ 93.

212 ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo testified before the Security Council that "[m]aintaining Harun
in his position as Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs was a direct threat to millions of victims and
to the humanitarian workers and peacekeepers seeking to protect them." Sudan Has Failed to Cooperate
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responsible for overseeing the deployment of the UNAMID peacekeeping
force. 21 3 Harun's current positions no doubt show that Sudan's Government is
wholly complicit in, and approves of, the genocide in Darfur. It represents Sudan's defiance of and disrespect for the international community, including the
U.N. and the ICC.
3.

The Pretrial Chamber Issued Arrest Warrantsfor Harun and Kushayb.

On May 2, 2007, the ICC Pretrial Chamber issued arrest warrants for Ahmad
Harun 214 and Ali Kushayb 21 5 for their alleged individual criminal responsibility
for crimes against humanity and war crimes under article 25(3)(a)(b) and (3)(d)
of the Rome Statute. The arrest warrant for Ahmad Harun lists forty-two
counts, 21 6 while the arrest warrant for Ali Kushayb lists fifty counts. 21 7 Harun
and Kushayb are charged with a combined fifty-one counts of war crimes2 18and
crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, torture, and persecution.

with International Criminal Court, Prosecutor Says, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, Dec. 5, 2007, available at
[hereinafter Sudan Not
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=24933&Cr=sudan&Crl=
Cooperating].
213 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ICC Chief Prosecutor, Conference on International Justice, supra note 9
("He is controlling the fate of his victims.").
214 Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-Al-Rahman, Case No. ICC02/05-01/07-2, Warrant of Arrest For Ahmed Harun (Apr. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Harun Warrant, Case
No. ICC-02/05-01/07-2].
215 Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-Al-Rahman, Case No. ICC02/05-01/07-3, Warrant Of Arrest For Ali Kushayb (Apr. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Kushayb Warrant, Case
No. ICC-02/05-01/07-3]. See also, Sudan Not Cooperating, supra note 212 (Ali Kushayb, "against
whom the Government had previously indicated that there was an investigation" was released on September 30, 2007 for alleged lack of evidence).
216 See Harun Warrant, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07-2. Twenty counts of crimes against humanity
(murder - articles 7(l)(a) and 25(3)(d); persecution - articles 7(l)(h) and 25(3)(d); forcible transfer of
population - articles 7(1)(d) and 25(3)(d); rape - articles 7(l)(g) and 25(3)(d); inhumane acts - articles
7(l)(k) and 25(3)(d)); imprisonment or severe deprivation of liberty - articles 7(1)(e) and 25(3)(d); and
torture - articles 7(l)(f) and 25(3)(d)); and twenty-two counts of war crimes (murder - articles 8(2)(c)(i)
and 25(3)(d); attacks against the civilian population - articles 8(2)(e)(i) and 25(3)(d); destruction of
property - articles 8(2)(e)(xii) and 25(3)(d); rape - articles 8(2)(e)(vi) and 25(3)(d); pillaging (articles
8(2)(e)(v) and 25(3)(d); and outrage upon personal dignity - articles 8(2)(c)(ii) and 25(3)(d)).
217 See Kushayb Warrant, Case No: ICC-02/05-01/07-3. Twenty-two counts of crimes against humanity (murder - article 7(1)(a); deportation or forcible transfer of population - article 7(l)(d); imprisonment
or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law article 7(l)(e); tortures - article 7(l)(f); persecution - article 7(l)(h); inhumane acts of inflicting serious
bodily injury and suffering - article 7(l)(k)); and twenty-eight counts of war crimes (violence to life and
person - article 8(2)(c)(i); outrage upon personal dignity in particular humiliating and degrading treatment - article 8(2)( c)(ii); intentionally directing an attack against a civilian population - article 8(2)(e)(i);
pillaging - article 8(2)(e)(v); rape - article 8(2)(e)(vi); destroying or seizing the property - article
8(2)(e)(xii)).
218 See generally, Amitis Khojasteh, The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition For
The International Criminal Court [AMICC], Questions & Answers On The ICC Arrest Warrants In The
Darfur Investigation 1 (June 6, 2007) availableat http://www.amicc.org/usinfo/advocacy-matefials.html
[hereinafter AMICC Q & A].
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The Chamber issued these arrest warrants because it found reasonable grounds
to believe that Harun and Kushayb would not voluntarily turn themselves in to
21 9
the Court.
4. ICC Indicts and Issues and Arrest Warrantfor Sudan President Omar AlBashir.
On July 14, 2008, the ICC Chief Prosecutor requested an arrest warrant from
the ICC Pre-trial Chamber for Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad AlBashir for ten counts of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes in Darfur. 220 The ICC Prosecutor explained that Al Bashir's "motives
were largely political. His alibi was a 'counterinsurgency.' His intent was genocide. "221 "In the [refugee] camps Al Bashir's forces kill the men and rape the
222
women. He wants to end the history of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa people.
Prosecutor Moreno left no doubt as to the extent of Bashir's involvement by
explaining that "[Bashir] used the whole state apparatus, he used the army, he
enrolled the Militia/Janjaweed. They all report to him, they all obey him. His
control is absolute. 22 3
And on March 4, 2009, the ICC's Pre-trial Chamber issued a historic arrest
warrant for Sudan's sitting President, Omar Al-Bashir for five counts of crimes
against humanity and two counts of war crimes for his "essential role" in the
murder, torture, rape, and displacement of millions of civilians in Darfur.224 The
Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe that in his position as the de jure
and de facto President of Sudan and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese
Armed Forces, Al-Bashir "played an essential role in coordinating, with other
high-ranking Sudanese political and military leaders, the design and implementation" of systematic and violent attacks against Darfur civilians. 22 5 Al-Bashir was
in "full control of all branches of the 'apparatus' of the State of Sudan," including the Sudanese Armed Forces and their allied Janjaweed Militia. 226 Al-Bashir
used this control to ensure implementation of the attacks in Darfur and is there219 Press Release, ICC, Warrants of Arrest for the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs of Sudan, and a leader of the Militia/Janjaweed, ICC-OTP-20070502-214 (May 2, 2007), available at http://

www2.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2007/warrants%2Oof%2Oarrest%
20for%20the%20minister%20of%20state%20for%20humanitarian%20affairs%20of%2sudan-%20and
%20a%20leader%20of%20the.
220 Press Release, ICC, ICC Prosecutor Presents Case Against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad Al

Bashir, For Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes in Darfur, ICC-OTP-20080714PR341-ENG (July 14, 2008), available at http://www2.icccpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/

press%20releases/press%20releases%20(2008)/a.
221 Id.
222

Id.

223 Id.
224

Bashir Warrant, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09.

225

Id. at 7.

226

Id.
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fore criminally responsible as an indirect perpetrator227or as an indirect co-perpetrator for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The government of Sudan and its allies certainly attempted to block the issuance of this arrest warrant against Al-Bashir by attempting to convince key African states on the Security Council to request a delay at the ICC.228 The Security
Council recently renewed the mandate for Darfur peacekeepers and refused to
delay the ICC legal proceedings against Omar Al-Bashir. 229 This decision by the
Security Council came in the face of attempts by Libya and South Africa to
include language that would have prevented ICC judges from considering an arrest warrant against Bashir. 230 Richard Dicker, the director of the International
Justice Program at Human Rights Watch called the "attempt to halt the ICC's
work ... blatant political interference with an independent court."'23 1 Not only
processes, but it has also continued
did Sudan attempt to curtail the ICC's legal
232
its deliberate attacks on Darfur civilians.
While the Prosecutor's decision to indict Al-Bashir fueled controversy with
many, including the Arab League and Africa analysts, claiming the indictment
would hamper the peace process and others haling it as a step in the direction of
international justice and the end to impunity, it apparently has had not direct
consequences on the people of Darfur or the peace process as of yet. 233 Other
critics opined that a Bashir arrest warrant would hurt the deliver of essential
humanitarian aid and the much awaited deployment of the full 20,000 U.N.
peacekeeping force in Darfur.2 34 Both of these critical endeavors, however, are
already bogged down by Sudanese obstruction and delay. 235 The Prosecutor's
indictment will affect the ongoing conflict in Darfur. The Prosecutor's decision
to bring the indictment when he had what he believed to be sufficient evidence is
a sign that this Prosecutor is not swayed by "politics," but rather, by his mandate
to prosecute international crimes. 236 And the ICC's subsequent issuance of a
227

Id.

228 UN: Renewed Peacekeeper Mandate for Darfur: US Abstains in Support of ICC Case Against
Sudan's President,HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, July 31, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/07/31/
sudan 19525.htm.
229 Id.
230

Id.

231 Id.
232 Id. ("[E]ver since the prosecutor requested the warrant two weeks ago, there have been reports of
at least two attacks, on villages by government forces.").
233 See, e.g., R. Green Controversy in the Arab World Over ICC Indictment of Sudan President AlBashir, MIDDLE E. MEDIA REs. INST., July 24, 2008, http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/16146.html; accord Louis Charbonneau, Sudan's Bashir CouldEscape War Crimes Indictment, REuTERS,July 16, 2008,
availableat http:llwww.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN 1639809920080716?feedType=RSS&feed
Name=WorldNews.
234 Richard Goldstone, Catching a War Criminal in the Act, N.Y. TiMES, July 15, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/opinion/15goldstone.html?_rr=-1 &scp=1 &sq=ICC%20al-Bashir&st=
cse&oref=slogin (Richard Goldstone is the former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda).
235 Id.
236 Id.
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warrant shows that it too can transcend politics in a pursuit for international
justice.
The enduring hope is that Ocampo's courage and integrity and the ICC's permanency can help change the international culture of impunity that is so offensive to the most fundamental notions of justice. Maybe the indictment and arrest
warrant for Bashir can help produce long-term systemic change and the fruit of
"peace"-if not today, then in the future. 2 37 This change, however, will not
come easily as governments confronted with their own failures and intentional
crimes will resist accountability at every turn.
5.

Sudan Has Refused to Execute Any of the Warrants

Sudan has continually rejected the ICC's jurisdiction over the Darfur situation
since the Security Council adopted Resolution 1593.238 Almost one year after
the ICC issued the two arrest warrants, testimony by ICC Prosecutor MorenoOcampo before the Security Council revealed that Sudan's Government continued to refuse to arrest or prosecute either Harun or Kushayb indicted by the ICC
for war crimes and crimes against humanity Sudan, 2 39 although it has all the
power to do S0.240 Sudan has, instead, responded to the ICC's arrest warrants by
suspending its cooperation with the ICC Prosecutor and by saying that it will not
surrender the indictees to the ICC.241
237 It is also worth considering what the ramifications might be if the ICC prosecutor decided not to
bring charges against Bashir just because Bashir threatened more "bloodshed" or because it was controversial. Every dictator and violent head of state and every terrorist leader or criminal could always
threaten "more bloodshed" and scare off public prosecutions. What kind of a precedent does that set for
international justice or any justice for that matter? Would it make the people of Africa safer if Bashir and
his cronies are assuaged? No. Rather, it would make those most in need of international intervention
increasingly more unsafe and insecure because they know that the international community (the ICC, the
U.N., and others) will not intervene if their perpetrator threatens more violence.
238 AMICC Q & A, supra note 218, at 2.
239 Sudan Not Cooperating, supra note 212; see also Save Darfur Pushes Sudan Sanctions, ICC Actions With The Security Council: Coalition 'The Security Council Is Abdicating Its Responsibility To
Ensure Security In The World,' available at www.savedarfur.org/newsroom/releases/save-darfur_
pushes sudan_sanctionsicc_actionwithsecuritycouncil/ ("I report today to the Security Council that
the Government of the Sudan has not complied with its legal obligations. The Government of the Sudan
has not complied with Resolution 1593. The Government of the Sudan is not cooperating with my Office,
or the Court.").
240 Press Release, Security Council, International Criminal Court Prosecutor Tells Security Council
Sudan's Government 'Not Cooperating' in Darfur Investigation, Massive Crimes Continue, U.N. Doc.
SC/9186 (Dec. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Security Council, 'Not Cooperating' in Darfur Investigation]. ICC
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo testified before the Security Council that"[t]he Government of the Sudan is
not cooperating with my Office, or the Court." Id. See also Darfur Fact Sheet, supra note 178, at 5
(noting that the "Sudanese Government, as the territorial State, has both the legal responsibility" and
ability to facilitate the appearance of the individuals).
241 AMICC Q & A, supra note 218, at 2. The African Union recently passed a resolution indicating
that it will not assist in the arrest of Bashir, although it is unclear whether all 30 African state signatories
to the Rome Treaty will abide by this resolution and thereby ignore their responsibilies under international law. African Move On Bashir Dismissed,BBC NEws, July 5, 2009 (noting that Botswana's refusal
to abide by the resolution). Bashir and Sudan's continued defiance to the ICC arrest warrants is clearly
and deliberately contrasted by the voluntary surrender of rebel leader Badr Idriss Abu Garda. In response
to an ICC court summons, the United Resistance Front leader turned himself into the Hague to face war
crimes charges for his alleged involvement in the 2007 killing of 12 AU peacekeepers. A member of the
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Instead of cooperating with the ICC, Sudan's armed forces targeted civilians
in air and ground attacks on villages in Darfur in the winter of 2008, according to
a report issued in Geneva by the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, and the joint mission in Darfur, UNAMID. 242 Sudanese officials
have also purposefully restricted and impeded access to humanitarian groups try244
ing to provide relief to the civilian population, 24 3 and even attacked them.
And in a blatant move of disrespect and scoff at UNAMID, the Sudanese Government on November 18, 2007 announced on its official website that Ahmad
Harun was appointed to the UNAMID national
monitoring mechanism group and
24 5
was overseeing that force's deployment.
There were also reports that Sudan painted their army aircrafts with U.N. and
AU colors and then used them on attacks in Darfur. 246 This action may have led
2 47
to the murder of eight AU peacekeepers in Sudan by rebel forces.
Sudan's government has similarly responded with defiance to the ICC's arrest
warrant for Bashir. Addressing a government-organized rally in Khartoum,
Bashir raised his arms with a big smile in complete defiance of the ICC's reasoned decision.2 48 Instead of responding to the accusations in court, Bashir acDarfurian delegation traveling with Abu Garda, Tadjadine Niam, said "We want to set an example to the
Sudanese leadership and others accused in Sudan. We believe the court is independent and impartial. Let
the others also come to the court." Marlise Simons, Darfurian Rebel Commander to Face War Crimes
Charges, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2009.
242 Robert Evans, U.N. Says Sudan Targeted Civilians In Darfur, REUTERS, Mar. 21, 2008, http://
www.reuters.com/articlelatestCrisis/idUSL20508924. Attacks were on the village of Saraf Jidad in January, and the villages of Sirba, Sileia and Abu Surouj on February 8. Id. These attacks came "during a
major military push by the Sudanese government against rebels in the area." Id. In February 2008, U.N.
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon condemned the bombing of a displaced person's camp in by Sudanese
government aircrafts in Jebel Moun. See also, Fighting Traps Darfur Refugees, BBC NEWS, Feb. 21,
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7255750.stm. Eyewitnesses and rebels said Sudanese army helicopters, Antonov aircrafts, and state-backed militias "carried out a three-pronged offensive."
243 Jerry Fowler noted that in 2003 and 2004 Sudan had an active effort to impede humanitarian
NGOs from delivering aid to Darfur's displaced and hungry population. At one point, there were 1
million displaced civilians and only 100 humanitarian aid workers. Simply put, the "people can not
survive without outside humanitarian aid." He reports that humanitarian access has decreased over the
last six months from November 2007 to April 2008. Apparently, Sudan is determined to commit genocide against the people of Darfur in every way practically and legally possible. The Rome Statute defines
genocide as:
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d)Imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 6.
244 Oxfam's Sudan representative, Alun MacDonald, reported in December 2007, that Oxfam "staff
are being targeted on a daily basis. They are being shot, robbed, beaten and abducted." Mike Thomson,
Wave of Violence Threatens Darfur Camps, BBC NEWS, Dec. 4, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
7125209.stm.
245 Sudan Not Cooperating, supra note 212.
246

Id.

247

Id.

Neil Macfarquhar & Marlise Simons, Bashir Defies War Crime Order,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.con2009/03/06/world/africa/06sudan.html.
248
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cused the ICC of colonialism and attempting to steal Sudan's oil resources. 249
Almost immediately after the warrant was issued, Bashir expelled thirteen international aid organizations that were a life-line for the people in Darfur. 250 The
European Commission has called on Sudan to immediately reverse the expulsion
orders, with EC spokesman for humanitarian aid John Clancy saying that "the
lives of hundreds of thousands of people are at stake.

'25 1

U.S. Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton made clear that President Bashir and the government in Khartoum "will be held responsible for every single death that occurs" because of
these expulsions.

252

The United States has also sought to persuade entities with influence over
Sudan, such as the Arab League, the African Union, and China, to pressure
Bashir to reverse his expulsion of these critically needed humanitarian agencies.
In a March meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, President Barack
Obama expressed his "deep concern" about the current humanitarian crisis in
Darfur and asked Beijing to pressure Sudan's government. 253 Whether these
U.S. efforts will actually bear tangible results in time to prevent an even greater
humanitarian crisis is yet to be seen.
With respect to the outstanding warrants, it remains unclear how can they will
be executed when the ICC lacks its own police force or marshal service. The
answer is simply but complex: the Court relies on States' cooperation in securing
254
the custody of wanted individuals.

C.

The United States Response

In 1997, long before the conflict in Darfur escalated to its current state, the
United States classified Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism based on the prevalence of human rights violations, including slavery and severe restrictions on
religious freedom in Sudan.255 The United States also took some military action
in 1998 when it launched missiles on a Sudanese site suspected of produced
249 Id.

250 Xan Rice, Sudan Aid Purge Puts Thousands At Risk, Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2009/mar/05/sudan-aid-purge-darfur-khartoum.
251 Id.

252 U.S. Increases Pressure On Sudan After Expulsions, Mar. 17, 2009, REUTERS, http://www.

savedarfur.org/newsroom/clips/usjincreases-pressure on-sudanafter expulsions/.
253 Id. See Jim Wallis & John Prendergast, Obama Can Make A Difference InDarfur: Solving The
Crisis Will Require U.S. Leadership, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2009 (laying out concrete action President
Obama and Special Envoy Gen. Gration should take to end the genocide). Thus far, Obama and Gration
have had some success as Sudan allowed four of the thirteen expelled humanitarian agencies back into
Darfur just one week after Gration met with Sudanese officials to press them on the crisis. Peter Baker,
Obama Urges Sudan to Allow Aid Groups Back Into the Country, N.Y. TIES, Mar. 30, 2009; Sudan
'Allows Aid Agencies Back,' BBC NEWS, June 12, 2009.
254 Court Issues Bashir Arrest Warrant, Mar. 5, 2009, ALJAZEERA.NET, http://english.aljazeera.net/
news/africa/2009/03/20093412473776936.html (quoting Stuart Alford of the War Crimes Committee at
the International Bar Association as saying that "the court doesn't have a police force and therefore relies
on those countries who have signed up to the court... to use their power and their police forces to make
the arrest").
255 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C §1701.
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chemical weapons. 256 Two years before the conflict began, Nina Shea, commissioner of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, expressed
world's most viothe Commission's view that "the government of Sudan is the
257
lent abuser of the right to freedom of religion and belief.
Shortly after the start of the Darfur conflict, the United States issued statements reflecting their concern about the situation. In early 2004, the United
States warned that it saw warning signs of genocide.2 58 On September 9, 2004,
former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powel, speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that the Government of Sudan and the government-sponsored Arab Janjaweed Militias was committing genocide and "bear
responsibility" for rapes, killings and other abuses that have displaced 1.2 million
Black Africans. 25 9 Colin Powell was the first to call the Darfur violence "genocide," and he did so when both the African Union and Arab League denied that
genocide was occurring. 260 Moreover, this was the first time any government
had accused another of committing genocide. 261 Powell's bold statement, however, ultimately returned void and the U.S. State Department argued that the finding of genocide did not impose any obligation on the United States to stop the
262
killing.
In addition to Powell's statements, the U.S. State Department released a report
that found a "consistent and widespread pattern of atrocities committed against
non-Arab villagers. '263 This report, based on 1,136 interviews with refugees
during the summer of 2004, found that "sixty-one percent had witnessed the killing of a family member and sixteen percent had been raped or had heard about a
rape victim. '264 Later that year, the U.S. Congress urged President George Bush
to "seriously" consider "unilateral intervention to stop [the] genocide in Darfur,
Sudan should the United Nations Security Council fail to act."'265 At the same
unanimously passed a resolution calling
time, the U.S. House of Representatives
266
the situation in Sudan genocide.
256 Timeline: Sudan, supra note 41.
257 AMBASSADOR SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI, HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, Item 9: Violation of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World, Mar. 30, 2001, http://geneva.usmission.
gov/humanrights/2002/statements/0330item9.html.
258 The crisis in Darfur, a timeline, supra note 74.

259 Gleen Kessler & Colum Lynch, US Calls Killings in Sudan Genocide, WASH. POST, Sept. 10,
2004, at A01, availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html [hereinafter Kessler & Lynch] ("We concluded - I concluded - that genocide has been committed in Darfur
and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility - and genocide may still be
occurring.").
260 Id. (writing that at that time the European Union said it had insufficient evidence to conclude a
genocide was being committed).
261 Prendergast & Thomas-Jensen, supra note 16, at 150.
Id.
Id.
264 Kessler & Lynch, supra note 259.
262
263

265 H.R. Con. Res. 467, 108th Cong. 10 (2004).
266 U.S. Congress Terms Situation in Darfur "Genocide," U.S. Department of State, http://usinfo.state.
gov/is/Archive/2004/Jul/26-233176.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).

Volume 6, Issue 2

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

395

The International Community Responds To Darfur
Three years after the House of Representatives passed its resolution, the
United States provided over four billion dollars in "assistance to the people of
Sudan and Eastern Chad. '2 67 Currently, the United States provides a quarter of
the cost of up-keep for the U.N./AU hybrid force. 268 In addition, the United
269
States constructed and still maintains thirty-four bases for AU peacekeepers.
The United States also contributes the largest amount of food aid by donating
40,000 metric tons of food a month. 270 President Bush, dissatisfied with the Sudanese government's total failure to end the violence, imposed sanctions on thirty
one companies owned or operated by the Sudanese government, along with three
individuals. 2 7 I Today, the United States is almost the only nation taking this type
of action. 272 China, along with several other countries, criticized the United
States. 273 Britain, though it considered supporting U.S. sanctions and imposing
their own, chose not to and refused to impose any sanctions.2 74
In addition to the U.S. federal government taking action, many U.S. states
have joined the divestment movement. In 2005, Governor Blagojevich of Illinois
approved a bill from the Senate prohibiting the state from investing in the government of Sudan or with any companies with business ties to Sudan. 275 Governor Blagojevich urged other states to follow their example and divest in a similar
fashion. 276 As of the spring of 2008, twenty-two U.S. states and over fifty universities have adopted Sudan divestment policies. 277 And many U.S. and international corporations have also divested from Sudan. 278
267 The United States Response to the Darfur Crisis, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/scp/92492.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.

271 Id.; See also U.S. Imposes New Sanctions Against Sudan, CNN NEWS, May 29, 2007, http:/Iwww.
cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/05/29/bush.sudan/index.html (last visited April 20, 2008).
272 The crisis in Darfur, a timeline, supra note 74.
273 Id.
274 Id.

275 Lucien J. Dhooge. Darfur, State Divestment Initiatives, and the Commerce Clause, 32 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 391, 391 (2007).
276 Id.

at 392.

277 Sudan Divestment Task Force, http://www.sudandivestment.org/home.asp (last visited Apr. 20,

2008).
278 "Nine major foreign companies-CHC Helicopter, ABB, Siemens, Rolls Royce, ICSA of India,
Schlumberger, Weatherford International, Weir Group and La Mancha Resources-have ceased problematic operations in Sudan or significantly changed their behavior in the country since the proliferation
of the Sudan divestment movement." Cooley and the Genocide Intervention Network Mark Passage of
Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act, REuTERS, Jan. 11, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/press
Release/idUS 135165+11 -Jan-2008+MW200801 11). In July 2005, the European Parliament unanimously
adopted a resolution calling on European Union members to support targeted Sudan divestment efforts.
Press Release, Sudan Divestment Task Force, Senate Banking Committee Sends Messages to Sudan 2
(Oct. 17, 2007), http://sudandivestment.org/docs/SADAPassesSenateCommittee on BankingPR_
10-17-07.pdf. In addition, many NGOs have taken the initiative to start divestment campaigns in several
countries, to convince companies and governments that they should divest. See Sudan Divestment Task
Force, Divestment Statistics, http://www.sudandivestment.org/statistics.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2008);
Darfur Divestment Worldwide, http://www.darfurdivestment.org/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
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Most recently, on March 18, 2009, President Barack Obama and Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton named Major General J. Scott Gration as the special envoy
for Sudan. 279 Obama called the appointment "a strong signal of my Administration's commitment to support the people of Sudan while seeking a lasting settlement to the violence that has claimed so many innocent lives. '2 80 Obama called
Sudan a priority for his Administration that "cries out for peace and for
28
justice." 1
V.

Proposal

A. The International Community Should Enforce All Three Outstanding ICC
Warrants
Under the Rome Statute, State Parties agree to use their respective national
authorities to arrest suspected perpetrators and transfer them to the Court. 282 Although Sudan is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1593, which referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC, requires all
parties to the Darfur conflict, including the Sudanese Government, to fully cooperate with Court.2 83 So, in theory, Sudan could be pressured to comply with
4
Resolution 1593 and enforce the ICC warrants. 28
U.N. Resolution 1593 was adopted under U.N. Charter chapter VII which authorizes the Security Council to make recommendations or decisions to maintain
and restore international peace and security.2 85 Chapter VII resolutions, such as
Resolution 1593, are binding on all U.N. members. 286 Additionally, when the
Security Council refers cases to the Court, the Council has the power to require
U.N. Member States, whether States Parties or non-States Parties to the ICC, to
cooperate with the Court in specific situations. The Council specifically did so in
Resolution 1593.
However, one year after the issuance of the arrest warrants, U.N. Member
States, and the five permanent members of the Security Council-China, Russia,
United States, Britain, and France-have failed to affect the arrest of the
279 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Announcement of Special Envoy for Sudan: Sudan Is
a Priority for Obama Administration, Mar. 18, 2009, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/
March/20090318171308xjsnommis0.326687.html&distid=ucs.

280 Id.
281

Id.

282 Rome Statute, supra note 9.
283 S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 168.
284 Security Council, 'Not Cooperating' in Darfur Investigation, supra note 240 (ICC Prosecuting
stating that Sudan must "remember ... that this issue is a part of their duties now that we have these
global legal standards" enshrined in the ICC.
"[t]he responsibility to execute the warrant is for the

Government of Sudan.").
285

U.N. Charter, art. 39, para. 1.

286 Id. art. 43, para. 1.
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and others to
criminals. 287 Opportunities remain, however, for all these nations 288
make the human rights of the people of Darfur of utmost priority.
There are several ways that members of the international community can and
should help enforce the ICC warrants. 289 We propose that every international
actor pursue all legal means available to enforce the ICC warrants and to bring
Harun and Kushayb to the ICC to face their charges, and hopefully, be held
accountable.
The international community should take additional steps to exert pressure on
Sudan's Government to effectuate the Court's arrest warrants. 290 The ICC
should also report Sudan's failure to cooperate to the U.N. Security Council and
the Council should take measures such as sanctions against Sudan. 29 1 Individual
targeted at
States should also introduce non-humanitarian-aid related sanctions
292
the Sudanese Government and military to demand compliance.
Neighboring African countries should also exert diplomatic pressure on Sudan
in order to persuade the Government to cooperate with the ICC.293 It is in the
best interest of all African countries that the perpetrators of Darfur's genocide be
held accountable for their crimes and brought to justice. Surely, this will produce
some deterrent effect on future would-be international criminals in war-torn
Africa.
Finally, AU and U.N. peacekeeping forces in Sudan should be authorized to
execute the arrest warrants if the Sudanese Government continues to fail to do
287 The United States did issue a strong statement following the ICC Prosecutor's December 2007
report to the Security Council, stating:
The United States is particularly troubled by the Prosecutor's report that the Government of
Sudan is still not cooperating and has taken no steps to arrest and surrender the two individuals
that are subject to ICC arrest warrants: current Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs Ahmad
Muhammad Harun and the Janjaweed leader known as Ali Kushayb. We call on the Sudanese
Government to cooperate fully with the ICC as required by resolution 1593.
Press Release, United States Mission to the United Nations, Statement by Jeffrey DeLaurentis, U.S.
Advisor, on the report of the ICC prosecutor Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo on Sudan, Dec. 5, 2007, available at http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/pressjreleases/20071205_353.html.
288 "[In December 2007] Britain introduced a toughly worded Presidential Statement at the U.N. Security Council, demanding that Khartoum's National Islamic Front regime turn over two g6nocidaires
[Ahmed Haroun and Ali Kushayb] to the International Criminal Court. The Presidential Statement
should've easily passed: The evidence against both men is strong, and because of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1593, the ICC has jurisdiction over the matter. What ended up happening, though, was hardly
a surprise to anyone who has watched Darfur closely over the last five years. China threatened to veto the
non-binding declaration unless its language was essentially gutted, and rather than force the issue, Britain, France, and the U.S.-as well as the other Security Council members--quietly decided to drop the
matter. As a result, not only will Haroun and Kushayb remain free, but the government in Khartoum will
feel as if it can block the extradition of those subsequently accused by the Court. The ICC just lost its
teeth. This under-reported development provides yet another example of China's enabling role in the
Darfur genocide." Eric Reeves, Partnersin Genocide, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 18, 2007, http://www.
tnr.com/politics/story.html?id= 1f4269dd-9d4f-4911-891 f-57ae85d66b70.
289 AMICC Q & A, supra note 218, at 2.
290

Id.

291

Id.

292

Id.

293

Id.
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SO. 294 No legal instrument in place prevents the U.N. from authorizing AU and
U.N. peacekeepers to arrest people named in an ICC arrest warrant.
Testifying before the Council, ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo asked: "When
will be a better time to arrest Harun? How many more women and girls have to
be raped? How many persons have to be killed?" 2 95 The answers to Ocampo's
questions are simple: "Immediately" has always been, and continues to be, the
best time to arrest Harun and Kushayb. We do not need another rape or murder
to be committed to act on these warrants.
What purpose would arresting Harun and Kushayb serve? First, it would help
realize the ICC's potential to be an international legal institution that punishes
severe international crimes. 296 In the words of the ICC Prosecutor Ocampo directed to the ears and hearts and minds of the U.N. Security Council members:
"It would send a signal to the perpetrators of crimes in Darfur that the international community was not only watching, but would hold them accountable for
their actions. '297 As such, it could deter future criminals.
But Prosecutor Ocampo points to another reason; one even more immediate
and pressing: "What is at stake is, simply, the life or death of 2.5 million people. ' 298 He states that "arresting Harun today will help peace, the political pro'299
cess, and the deployment of peacekeepers.
It is clear that, although the international community succeeded in ending the
North-South civil war, it utterly failed to hold any of its perpetrators accountable.
That is exactly the kind of impunity that fueled Sudan's boldness to start the
genocide in Darfur even before the North-South conflict was over. And unless
Harun, Al-Kushayb, and Al-Bashir are brought to account, Khartoum's regime
and Arab militias will be emboldened to stoke the flames of suffering in the
South as the South seeks to secede in 2010 from the genocidal regime called
Khartoum.
History still waits patiently for someone to write this chapter; the chapter that
ends with two key perpetrators of the horrendous atrocities in Darfur being
brought to justice in a permanent international tribunal named the International
Criminal Court; the chapter that says that 2.5 million displaced Darfuris were
saved from ultimate death.
B.

Make R2P A Binding International Norm

In 2000, in his Millennium Report to the General Assembly, U.N. SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan confronted a key criticism of humanitarian intervention with
these words: "[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault
Id.
Security Council, 'Not Cooperating' in Darfur Investigation, supra note 240.
296 Fanton, supra note 19.
297 Security Council, 'Not Cooperating' in Darfur Investigation, supra note 240 (telling Security
Council members that "[y]ou can make a difference, you can break the criminal system").
298 Id. (emphasis added).
299 ICC Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Conference on International Justice, supra note 9.
294
295
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on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross
and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our com30
mon humanity?" 3 °° In response to this challenge by Secretary-General Annan,
the Canadian government created the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS).302 The ICISS completed its report, Responsibility
to Protect (R2P), in September of 2001.303
The 108-page R2P report is very detailed and comprehensive. The R2P Report lays out the responsibilities to prevent, to react, and to rebuild. 3°4 The Report emphasizes the need to prevent international crimes from happening in the
first place. 30 5 States also have a responsibility to react if crimes against humanity
or large scale atrocities are being committed. 30 6 Finally, the international combroken by war through reconciliation and remunity must rebuild30communities
7
construction efforts.
With regard to intervention, the R2P Report, importantly, calls for military
intervention as a remedy of last resort. 30 8 The only just cause for military intervention is to prevent or stop "large scale loss of life" or "large scale 'ethnic
cleansing."'' 30 9 The intervention's main purpose must be to prevent or stop
human suffering. 310 The military intervention must be only that which is necesto the
sary for the humanitarian purpose, and actions taken must be proportional
31 2
end goal. 31' The intervention requires Security Council authorization.
Based in large part on the R2P report by the ICISS, the R2P principle was
formally endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit:
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
300 The Millennium Assembly of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century, 217, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000* (Mar.
27, 2000).
301 U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 1st plen. mtg. (Sept. 20, 1999) (statements by Secretary-General Kofi
Annan also chalAnnan, http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/statments-search-full.asp?statlD=28).
lenged the international community to "find common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter,
and acting in defence of our common humanity." Id.
302 ICISS Report, supra note 21, at vii. The ICISS was co-chaired by International Crisis Group'
President Gareth Evans and Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun.
303

Id. at ix.

304 Id. at xi.
305 Id. (noting also the need for an "early warning system").
306 Id. at 29-37.
307 Id. at 39-45.
308

ICISS Report, supra note 21, at 36-37.
at xii, 32.
Id. at xii, 35.

309 Id.
310

311 Id.at xii, 37.
312 Id.at xii, 50. Should the Council reject a proposal or take an unreasonably long time to respond,
the "Uniting for Peace" procedure permits the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session to consider the case, and regional organizations could also act after receiving Security Council authorization.
Id. at 53-54.
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This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their

incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the

responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter,
to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
3 13
and crimes against humanity.
Before this declaration, several other integral members of the international
community embraced R2P, including the AU, EU, former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 3 14 and the U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change. 3 15 The U.N. Security Council also recently reaffirmed the R2P principles in a 2006 resolution. 31 6 Current Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon strongly
supports the concept of the responsibility to protect, especially in situations like
Darfur.3 17 And even Pope Benedict XVI, in a recent speech to the U.N., explicitly affirmed the R2P principle by saying that while "every state has the primary
duty to protect its own population from grave and sustained violations of human
rights. . . [i]f states are unable to guarantee such protection, the international
community must intervene with the juridical means provided in the United Na3 18
tions charter and in other international instruments.
We call on the U.N. to continue to affirm and implement the principle of R2P.
We call on every U.N. Member State and every State Party to the Rome Statute,
to do likewise. No longer should the notion of "sovereignty" tie the hands of the
international community while vulnerable girls and women are systematically
raped, and gang raped; while families and ethnic groups are destroyed; while
3 19
those with power callously and fearlessly crush the lives of the oppressed.
313 G.A. Res 60/1,
138, 139, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1 (Sept. 14-16, 2005).
314 General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security And Human Rights For All, 1 132, 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
315 The Secretary-General, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, IT 201-203, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter A More Secure World]; but see Michael Clough, Darfur:
Whose Responsibility To Protect?, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://hrw.org/wr2k5/darfur/1.htm (last visited May 1, 2009). In December 2004, the High Level Panel on Threats "acknowledged the failure of the
U.N. to prevent atrocities against civilians and recommended reforms to enhance the U.N.'s capacity to
carry out its collective security mandate. The High Level Panel also strongly endorsed the emerging
norm that there is an international responsibility to protect civilians in situations where governments are
powerless or unwilling to do so. So far, however, these initiatives have afforded no protection to the
people of Darfur." Id.
316 S.C. Res. 1674, T 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
317 Warran Hoge & Ian Fisher, In Speech, Pope Urges Promotion of Human Rights, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
18, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/18/us/nationalspecial2/1 8cnd-pope.html?-r=- I &
hp&oref=slogin.
318 Id.
319 For some, the new interventions herald a new world in which human rights trumps state sovereignty; for others, it ushers in a world in which big powers ride roughshod over the smaller ones, manipulating the rhetoric of humanitarianism and human rights. ICISS Report, supra note 21, at 2. Pope
Benedict also noted that international intervention to stop human rights abuses "should never be interpreted as an unwarranted imposition or a limitation of sovereignty" but rather "[o]n the contrary, it is
indifference or failure to intervene that do [sic] the real damage." UN Has Duty to Protect, But Should
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The International Community Responds To Darfur
The international community has a moral and legal responsibility to protect
civilians from crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes when their
governments refuse to; this universal truth should become a binding rule of international law.
VI.

Conclusion

There is hope that the ICC and international community will respond to genocide and crimes against humanity by holding those most responsible accountable
for their crimes, and, by doing so, end the epidemic of impunity. There is hope
that the notion of a responsibility to protect will become a binding rule of international law.
What the international community needs now is less talk, less resolutions, less
declarations, and more action, more intervention, more protection; and more justice. Today, we need national and international leaders of integrity and courage
to rise up, speak out, and act to execute the ICC arrest warrants for Ahmad
Harun, Ali Kushayb, and Al-Bashir. These historic acts constitute the next chapter in the enforcement and advancement of international law and international
justice. The chapter is still being written.
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